

Takings-Based Limitations on the Power of State and Local Governments to Change Land Use Patterns to Combat Childhood Obesity

VERMONT

This memorandum summarizes Vermont takings law and the manner in which it limits the power of the state and its local political subdivisions to either condemn land to use for anti-obesity initiatives or adopt land use regulations to implement such initiatives. It should be read with our overview memo, which can be found at www.nplan.org/nplan/products/takings_survey. Our goal in this memo is to inform state and local decision makers considering exercising their powers of eminent domain or adopting land use restrictions as part of an effort to combat childhood obesity. The analysis that follows addresses the limitations placed on eminent domain and zoning authority by applicable takings law. It assumes that the governmental entity considering using eminent domain or regulatory zoning authority has been delegated such powers by the state.

This memorandum does not purport to provide legal advice. The analysis we provide is preliminary and not the sort of case-specific, detailed analysis necessary to ensure that a proposed policy will be insulated from takings liability. It does not substitute for consultation with a lawyer, and we urge any political decision maker to confer with an attorney knowledgeable about land use and takings law in Vermont before undertaking a particular policy initiative. If there are important cases, statutes, or analysis that we have omitted from this memorandum, please inform us by sending an email to info@phlpnet.org.

State and local governments are increasingly concerned with the rise in childhood obesity rates among their citizens. In response, they are turning their attention to policies that might combat this alarming trend. Many of these policies involve changing the physical environment in which children spend their days. This physical environment encompasses both public and private spheres. The public sphere includes the network of roads, sidewalks, and recreational paths that make up the community, as well as the various parks, playgrounds, open spaces, public gardens, and lighting that most people think of as public infrastructure. The private sphere includes the various types of development that exist on private property in the community, such as single-family homes, multifamily dwellings, apartment complexes, restaurants, grocery stores, health clubs, and all manner of other private developments.

In many communities, neither the public nor the private physical environment encourages active living and healthy eating. Indeed, the infrastructure in many communities actively discourages or effectively impedes healthy life choices. Too many children grow up in communities that lack parks, playgrounds, and safe, well-lit open spaces to play, have no full-service grocery stores or sit-down healthy restaurants, but are saturated with formula restaurants selling high-calorie, high-fat foods and corner stores selling junk food and sugary drinks. Studies suggest that communities can combat childhood obesity by changing the physical environment in which children live. Positive environment changes would promote active and healthy lifestyles, by fostering development of infrastructure such as public parks and playgrounds, full-service

grocery stores, and well-lit open spaces, and would eliminate the negative influences of the community infrastructure, such as fast-food restaurants and dark, overgrown vacant lots.¹

Communities around the country have already begun to adopt policies and programs designed to change their physical environment, using various strategies and tools. For example, Santa Clara County, California, has adopted a Countywide Trails Master Plan that details the county's commitment to acquiring dedicated easements over private property to create a 500-mile trail system throughout the county to provide recreational and fitness opportunities for its citizens.² Several years ago King County, Washington, adopted a property tax increase to fund the acquisition and maintenance of publicly owned parks and recreation facilities.³ The Los Angeles City Council has imposed a one-year moratorium on the opening of new fast-food restaurants in South Los Angeles.⁴ This zoning ordinance provides a respite during which the city can adopt and implement policies designed to encourage the opening of healthy eating alternatives in the area, which is currently saturated with fast-food restaurants and plagued by high obesity rates. Finally, Naperville, Illinois, has adopted an ordinance requiring developers to include a minimum number of bicycle parking facilities in all new commercial, residential, and public property developments, to encourage biking as an alternative to driving.⁵

Each of these initiatives targets an important aspect of the physical environment, and each involves a different type of government action. The Santa Clara County and King County initiatives require the local governments to acquire property rights in private property—in Santa Clara County the acquisition is by forced dedication⁶ and involves a partial interest in the property, while in King County the acquisition is by eminent domain and involves full title. In contrast, the Los Angeles and Naperville ordinances are two distinct examples of land use

¹ See, e.g., KELLY D. BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATTLE HORGAN, *FOOD FIGHT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FOOD INDUSTRY, AMERICA'S OBESITY CRISIS, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT* (2004); L. D. Frank, M. A. Anderson & T. L. Schmid, *Obesity Relationships with Community Design, Physical Activity, and Time Spent in Cars*, 27 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 87 (2004) (showing that neighborhood walkability was related to obesity in adults); Simone A. French et al., *Environmental Influences on Eating and Physical Activity*, 22 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 309 (2001); P. Gordon-Larsen, M. C. Nelson, P. Page & B. M. Popkin, *Inequality in the Built Environment Underlies Key Health Disparities in Physical Activity and Obesity*, 117 PEDIATRICS 417 (2006) (demonstrating that proximity of recreation facilities is correlated with the risk of overweight and obesity in children); James O. Hill & John C. Peters, *Environmental Contributions to the Obesity Epidemic*, 280 SCI. 1371 (1998); Kate Painter, *The Influence of Street Lighting Improvements on Crime, Fear, and Pedestrian Street Use after Dark*, 35 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 193 (1996); see also L. V. Moore, A. V. Diez Rous, J. A. Nettleton & D. R. Jacobs, *Associations of the Local Food Environment with Diet Quality: A Comparison of Assessments Based on Surveys and Geographic Information Systems*, 167(8) AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 917 (2008) (ePub) (showing that the availability of supermarkets in neighborhoods was associated with a better-quality diet).

² Santa Clara County Trails Plan Advisory Committee, Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors, Final Countywide Trails Master Plan (Nov. 1995), available at http://www.sccgov.org/SCC/docs%2FParks%20and%20Recreation%2C%20Department%20of%20%28DEP%29%2Fattachments%2F47616ctywide_trails_masterplan.pdf.

³ KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 4.08.082 (2009).

⁴ Kim Severson, *Los Angeles Stages a Fast Food Intervention*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/dining/13calo.html>.

⁵ NAPERVILLE, ILL., CITY CODE § 6-9-7 (2009).

⁶ A community can require a landowner to dedicate an easement for public use as a condition of a development permit only when that dedication shares an essential nexus with and is roughly proportionate to the impacts caused by the proposed development. See *Dolan v. City of Tigard*, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); *Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n*, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). This constraint is discussed in detail in www.nplan.org/nplan/products/takings_survey.

restrictions. The Los Angeles ordinance limits what landowners can do with their private property, while the Naperville ordinance imposes an affirmative requirement on private landowners.

These four specific initiatives illustrate the two primary tools available to communities that seek to use land use initiatives to prevent childhood obesity: They can rely on their power of eminent domain, on their land use regulatory authority, or both. The first option—relying on the power of eminent domain to acquire ownership interests in real property—may be used to provide public infrastructure such as parks, playgrounds, and recreational trails to promote healthy, active lifestyles. The second option—adopting land use restrictions applicable to private property—may be used to limit undesirable land uses (such as fast-food restaurants) in vulnerable neighborhoods or to require private property owners to do certain things on their property (such as install bicycle parking structures or stock healthy food in corner stores).

Communities that set out to combat childhood obesity by changing their physical environment using eminent domain or land use regulation will face limitations from both federal and state law in both contexts. The federal limitations come from the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” This prohibition is interpreted in two parts. First, private property may not be taken unless it is for public use.⁷ Second, if a land use restriction imposes such a burden on private property that the courts conclude it is the equivalent of a taking, the government must pay just compensation.⁸ A comprehensive analysis of the scope and extent of these federal constitutional limits can be found at www.nplan.org/nplan/products/takings_survey.

In addition to the federal constitutional limitations, every state imposes its own restrictions on the exercise of eminent domain and the imposition of land use regulations by its communities. These limitations, contained in state constitutions as well as statutes, may be more protective of private property than the federal Constitution, and they generally take three forms. First, state laws might incorporate a narrower definition of “public use,” such that a legislative objective that satisfies the public use requirement of the federal Constitution would be invalid under state law. Second, state law might require compensation for land use restrictions that would not be considered takings under the federal Constitution. Finally, state law may require a community to tolerate certain negative aspects of the physical environment (such as fast-food restaurants) that it would rather eliminate, just because those elements were present before the community undertook its reform initiative—commonly referred to as “grandfathering.”

Communities interested in using land use initiatives to change their physical environment and thereby combat childhood obesity have to be aware of these restrictions on their eminent domain powers and regulatory authority. The purpose of this memo is to explore and explain the particular limitations applicable to communities in Vermont, including constitutional and statutory provisions that limit the eminent domain power or require communities to compensate landowners for validly adopted land use restrictions. Section 1 addresses limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section 2 addresses limitations on the imposition of

⁷ See, e.g., *Kelo v. City of New London*, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

⁸ See, e.g., *Pa. Coal v. Mahon*, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

land use restrictions through changes in zoning laws. Section 3 explores the scope of the requirement that existing land uses be “grandfathered” under any new zoning regime.

1. Eminent Domain and the Requirement of Public Use

Eminent domain is the forced sale of private land to the public for public use. Ideally, a community that wants to convert private property to a public use negotiates an acceptable purchase price with the current owner of the property, and the sale is entirely voluntary. Occasionally, however, the owner of the parcel does not wish to sell. In these circumstances, many communities have the authority to compel the landowner to sell the property, as long as they pay a fair market price and put the property to public use. The federal Constitution has very little to say about the meaning of the phrase “public use.” In its decision in *Kelo v. City of New London*, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its past holdings that state and local decision makers enjoy broad discretion to define the concept of “public use,” and upheld the condemnation of private property for transfer to another private party for the purpose of economic development.⁹ States are free, however, to adopt greater protections for private property owners, and many states have done so by limiting the range of projects that count as public use.

The Vermont Constitution states that “private property ought to be subservient to public uses when necessity requires it, nevertheless, whenever any person’s property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money.”¹⁰ The Vermont Supreme Court has held that this provision prohibits the condemnation of private property for purely private use, and has defined public use fairly broadly. In *Tyler v. Beacher*, the court held that a proposed condemnation for the purpose of operating a private grist mill did not constitute public use.¹¹ In subsequent cases, however, the court made clear that public use does not require that the condemned property be open to all or even to a considerable portion of the public.¹² Rather, the question of public use is determined by the character of the use, and the generation of electricity by a private company for sale to limited members of the public constitutes public use.¹³

The Vermont legislature enacted eminent domain reform in the wake of *Kelo*, prohibiting the taking of private property “if the taking is primarily for purposes of economic development.”¹⁴ However, this limitation does not affect the authority of local governments to use eminent domain for “public property, buildings, hospitals, and parks.”¹⁵ Nor does it apply to condemnations for urban renewal projects.¹⁶

Overall, communities in Vermont enjoy broad latitude to use eminent domain to pursue initiatives designed to combat childhood obesity. Public use is defined broadly in Vermont, and the recent statutory reform prohibits the exercise of eminent domain only when the primary purpose of the condemnation is economic development. Thus, communities will not be limited

⁹ *Kelo* is discussed in detail in www.nplan.org/nplan/products/takings_survey.

¹⁰ VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 2.

¹¹ *Tyler v. Beacher*, 44 Vt. 648 (1871).

¹² *See, e.g., Rutland Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Clarendon Power Co.*, 83 A. 332, 335 (Vt. 1912).

¹³ *Grice v. Vt. Elec. Power Co.*, 956 A.2d 561, 570-71 (Vt. 2008).

¹⁴ VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040(a) (2008).

¹⁵ *Id.* § 1040(b)(3).

¹⁶ *Id.* § 1040(a).

by the takings clause in their use of eminent domain to provide public recreational infrastructure such as parks, playgrounds, and hike and bike trails. Moreover, even more innovative uses of eminent domain, such as the condemnation of private property to transfer to another private owner to operate a grocery store selling healthy foods, may not run afoul of the statutory reforms since the primary purpose will not be economic development.

2. Land Use Regulation and Compensation

Most government initiatives to combat childhood obesity by creating a healthy living environment will rely on zoning powers, not the exercise of eminent domain. For example, the City of Los Angeles has placed a moratorium on the building of new fast food restaurants in South Los Angeles. Land use regulations such as these rarely implicate takings concerns, and governments are generally free to adopt such regulations without incurring takings liability.

However, some land use regulations do require compensation. Any land use regulation so severe that it amounts to the functional equivalent of a taking requires payment of just compensation. The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted two bright-line rules and a balancing test to determine whether a land use regulation constitutes a taking under federal law. First, a regulation that imposes a permanent physical occupation on private land is a taking as a matter of law.¹⁷ Second, a regulation that deprives a landowner of all economically viable use is a taking as a matter of law.¹⁸ All other land use regulations—the vast majority of regulations—are evaluated under an ad hoc multifactor test.¹⁹ A regulation that does not satisfy one of the bright-line rules will rarely be considered a taking under the U.S. Constitution.²⁰ As with eminent domain, however, states are free to adopt a regulatory takings framework that provides more protections to property owners than does the U.S. Constitution.

The Vermont Supreme Court has had little opportunity to develop a jurisprudence of regulatory takings. As recently as 1992, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said, “the Vermont Supreme Court recognizes a cause of action for a taking generally, even if it has yet to decide whether recovery can be had for a regulatory taking.”²¹ Subsequent Vermont Supreme Court cases indicate that the court will interpret the Vermont compensation requirement as coterminous with the U.S. Constitution.²² For example, in *Chioffi v. City of Winooski*, the Vermont Supreme Court relied on federal precedent to reject a landowner’s claim that the application of a zoning regulation was an unconstitutional taking because the zoning board would not grant an exemption for his nonconforming use, which had expired due to discontinuance.²³ The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the land retained some economically beneficial use, and that the regulation did not interfere with reasonable investment-

¹⁷ *Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.*, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).

¹⁸ *Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council*, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

¹⁹ *Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City*, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

²⁰ Regulatory takings liability under the U.S. Constitution is discussed in more detail in www.nplan.org/nplan/products/takings_survey.

²¹ *Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz*, 980 F.2d 84, 100 (2d Cir. 1992).

²² See *Killington Ltd. v. State*, 668 A.2d 1278, 1281-83 (Vt. 1995); *Hinsdale v. Vill. of Essex Junction*, 572 A.2d 925, 930 (Vt. 1990).

²³ *Chioffi v. City of Winooski*, 676 A.2d 786, 787-88 (Vt. 1996).

backed expectations because the landowner could not have reasonably expected that the expired nonconforming use would be permitted.²⁴

Because Vermont law appears to mirror federal law on the issue of regulatory takings, and because the threshold for finding a compensable taking is so high at the federal level, community efforts to combat childhood obesity are unlikely to give rise to valid regulatory takings claims.

3. Grandfathering Prior Nonconforming Uses

The discussion in Section 2 assumes that the zoning restriction imposed on a landowner does not attempt to prohibit the very use to which she is currently putting her property. In some circumstances, a community may wish to prohibit a preexisting use to further its goals of combating childhood obesity. For example, a community may want to eliminate fast-food establishments within a certain distance of schools, including those restaurants that are already operating. Communities in Vermont generally will not be able to do this without paying compensation.

Vermont protects the rights of landowners to continue nonconforming uses by statute.²⁵ However, this provision makes clear that nonconforming uses are disfavored, and to achieve the purposes of zoning in general communities can regulate and prohibit the expansion and undue perpetuation of nonconforming uses.²⁶ This statutory provision was enacted in 2004, and Vermont case law on the issue of nonconforming uses applies the repealed provision, which was more favorable to nonconforming uses.²⁷

Nonetheless, even under the old statute Vermont courts recognized the problems posed by nonconforming uses and the importance of bringing land into conformance with the current zoning ordinance. The Vermont Supreme Court has stated that “[n]onconforming uses are inconsistent with the purpose of zoning and are tolerated only because they are antecedent to the applicable zoning provisions” so that the “goal of zoning must be to phase out such uses.”²⁸ In addition, the Vermont Supreme Court has interpreted grandfathering protections in light of “Vermont public policy of phasing out and eliminating nonconforming uses.”²⁹ Given the general presumption against the undue continuation of nonconforming uses and the statutory grant of authority for communities to regulate nonconforming uses to discourage their expansion and perpetuation, communities appear to have extensive powers to control the enlargement or expansion of nonconforming uses, and to provide for the forfeiture of the right to continue the use if the use is discontinued for a period of time.

²⁴ *Id.* at 789-90 (citing *Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council*, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), and *Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City*, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).

²⁵ VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4412(7) (2008).

²⁶ *Id.* § 4412.

²⁷ *Id.* § 4408 (repealed 2003).

²⁸ *Chioffi*, 676 A.2d at 789 (quoting *Agins v. City of Tiburon*, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).

²⁹ *In re Lashins*, 807 A.2d 420, 425 (Vt. 2002).

The takings law of the State of Vermont is generally favorable to communities wishing to pursue land use policies to combat childhood obesity. The Vermont courts rely on federal precedent to interpret the state's takings clause. Although communities will not be able to require the immediate cessation of existing uses as part of an initiative to combat childhood obesity, they will be able to limit the expansion or enlargement of such uses, and can provide for the forfeiture of the right in the event of discontinuance.